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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
YouthSave, a consortium initiative created in partnership with 
The MasterCard Foundation, was established in 2010 to inves-
tigate the potential of  youth savings accounts as a tool for youth 
development and financial inclusion in developing countries. 
Guided by this vision, the YouthSave Consortium and its bank 
partners in Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, and Nepal, embarked on 
a rigorous product development process beginning with market 
research with over 2,100 youth aged 12-18 and almost 400 adults. 
Overall, the research suggested that accounts enabling both safe, 
affordable accumulation of  longer term savings as well as emer-
gency access to funds could be an attractive value proposition 
for low-income youth.1 In response, YouthSave’s bank partners 
designed four different youth savings products that incorporated 
this and other country-specific findings. 
Here, the product development processes diverged.  Three 
out of  YouthSave’s four partners — HFC Bank in Ghana, Bank 
of  Kathmandu in Nepal, and Kenya Postbank — elected to 
pilot test their new youth-focused products prior to full-scale 
rollout. The fourth, Colombia’s Banco Caja Social, chose to 
proceed to market rollout without external pilot testing.  This 
paper describes the decisions around pilot testing made by 
YouthSave’s partner banks, as well as product- and process-level 
lessons learned by those that piloted.  In particular, it summa-
rizes findings on a common set of  questions these banks sought 
to answer via the pilot tests, which were conducted between July 
and December 2011.
Product uptake. The main motivation for the banks that 
elected to pilot test was the chance to test the market response, 
i.e. to test whether the product appealed to targeted youth and 
1 Deshpande, Rani (2012). “What Do Youth Savers Want? Results from Market Research in Four Countries.” Washington, DC: Save the Children. 
whether they could access and use it. Worldwide, youth-focused 
financial services remain a new and experimental business, and 
the three piloting banks had no directly comparable products in 
their portfolios. Two of  them set pilot targets based on factors 
including past performance of  other types of  accounts, while the 
third chose not to set targets, but instead to pursue the pilot as a 
purely exploratory exercise. 
Overall, the banks mobilized 1,317 youth savings accounts 
during the pilots. However, the most important uptake-related 
lessons were not about the numbers, but about the drivers behind 
them.
One of  the most critical lessons was about the importance 
of  young people’s access to their accounts. When it became 
clear that many youth lived prohibitively far from branches, the 
banks responded by reaching out to youth where they were.  For 
school-going youth, school-based marketing and delivery systems 
implemented by two partners enabled them to reach large num-
bers of  potential clients at once.  However, strategies piloted to 
reach out-of-school youth were not nearly as successful.  For this 
sub-segment, access is not only about distance but about legal 
and social deficits such as lack of  identification documents or a 
relationship with a trusted adult — obstacles that may require a 
differentiated delivery model to overcome.
Staff  buy-in at the branch level also proved to be a key driver 
of  uptake. For all three participating institutions, the perfor-
mance of  individual branches during the pilot varied dramati-
cally. While some of  this variation was due to branch location, 
the banks also attributed it to the enthusiasm and commitment 
inspired by some branch managers. To secure buy-in from 
the outset, pilot branch staff  received extensive, face-to-face 
trainings before the pilots were launched. However, the banks 
found that additional means of  communicating the importance 
of  this new product were required as well. One bank re-
sponded with intensified internal communications and training, 
which resulted in a 42 percent increase in account uptake in 
less than one month. 
Account usage. Along with total uptake numbers, the 
banks hoped to understand usage patterns of  a typical account, 
especially whether youth were more interested in transactional 
The most important pilot-related lessons 
were not about the numbers achieved, but 
rather about the drivers behind them.
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behavior or were really interested in saving for the medium to 
long term. Transaction frequency and average deposit balances 
obviously also had implications for the product’s viability at scale. 
All three partners found that deposits significantly outpaced 
withdrawals — in Nepal, by a factor of  218 in terms of  transac-
tions. Interestingly, this pattern did not appear causally linked to 
restrictions on withdrawals. The Ghanaian partner, whose product 
prohibited withdrawals for the first three months and limited them 
to monthly thereafter, achieved the desired customer behavior – 
many fewer withdrawals than deposits, even after the three-month 
period lapsed – but so too did the Kenyan and Nepalese partners, 
neither of  whose products included such a restriction.2
Customer satisfaction. Although a pilot by design tests 
short-term questions, customer satisfaction issues have uniquely 
longer-term implications where youth savings are concerned, 
given the importance of  client retention and future cross-sales 
to the business case for youth savings.  At this early stage, at 
least, the pilots indicated that partner banks were laying a solid 
foundation for creating satisfied customers. Youth in all three 
markets reported that they liked being clients of  a bank, as this 
was considered a privilege and a sign of  social prestige, and 
agreed that bank staff  were friendly, respectful, and helpful. 
They also appreciated knowing that funds could not be with-
drawn from their accounts without their knowledge.  On the 
other hand, the pilots indicated the need to fine tune various 
other product features (e.g. promotional items) and, in Nepal, 
revealed an opportunity to radically simplify the product design 
without losing its appeal to young customers.
Youth savings is a relatively new trend in financial services, 
particularly in low-income countries, and one that remains in 
experimental stages. Given the still scant information available 
on youth savings performance, piloting their new accounts was 
particularly important for the three YouthSave partners whose 
experience is described here.  It is our hope that this paper will 
similarly inform others who wish to provide or support the 
provision of  youth savings services, in order to contribute to 
the financial services industry’s expertise and commitment to 
serving low-income young people.
2 More quantitative information on pilot test results can be found in Johnson, L., Lee, Y., Osei-Akoto, I., Njenga, M., & Sharma, S. (2012). “Product pilot report: Youth sav-
ings performance in Ghana, Kenya, and Nepal” (YouthSave Research Brief  12-38). St. Louis, MO: Washington University, Center for Social Development. 
Youth savings is a relatively new trend 
in financial services, particularly in low-
income countries, and one that remains 
in experimental stages. It is our hope 
that this paper will similarly inform 
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the provision of  youth savings services, 
in order to contribute to the financial 
services industry’s expertise and commit-
ment to serving low-income young people.
Young Chetansil Yuwa Bachat Yojana accountholders make deposits into their  
savings accounts during an in-school banking visit in Bhaktapur, Nepal.  
Photo credit: Save the Children.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, youth savings accounts have come 
to be seen as a tool with the potential to promote both financial 
inclusion and youth development. For people of  all ages, a safe 
place to save can be helpful in building up a cushion against 
economic shocks. For young people specifically, a growing body 
of  research suggests that youth savings correlates with better 
outcomes across a range of  indicators. Specifically, savings have 
been associated with better mental health, educational attainment, 
and less-risky sexual attitudes and behaviors.3
For financial institutions (FIs), a well-designed youth savings 
account may encourage the creation of  a new generation of  loyal 
customers at a time when there is less competition for their busi-
ness.  In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that serving youth 
can create opportunities for acquiring new clients among young 
people’s family and friends.  It may also help enhance a FI’s brand 
and contribute to corporate social responsibility goals.
In response to the growing interest in youth savings, in 2010 
The MasterCard Foundation launched YouthSave, a consortium 
project led by Save the Children in partnership with the Cen-
ter for Social Development at Washington University, the New 
America Foundation, and CGAP. Over the past three years, 
YouthSave has co-developed youth savings accounts with local 
banks in four countries — Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, and Nepal 
— and is currently examining the social and commercial out-
comes of  those accounts. As of  February 2013 (approximately 
nine months into rollout), almost 23,000 young people had saved 
a total of  approximately USD 225,000 in project-sponsored 
accounts. In selected communities, Save the Children is also deliv-
ering complementary financial education programming to help 
young people better manage their money, including through tools 
like partner banks’ youth savings accounts.4
YouthSave chose its partner banks primarily on the basis of  
their commitment to and experience with youth and/or small-
balance savings, and their potential for scale. Save the Children 
and partner banks then undertook extensive market demand 
studies in each of  the four project countries, involving over 
2,100 youth aged 12-18 from mainly low-income households, 
and almost 400 key adults like parents, teachers, and community 
leaders.5 The first-hand data obtained via this market research 
was then used to develop product concepts, which were tested 
through focus groups with youth. Finally, the tested concepts 
were vetted by a cross-functional team within each of  the partner 
banks, in order to arrive at the final product prototype. 
By mid-2011, this process had been substantially completed. 
The decision then was whether to proceed to full-scale rollout – 
or whether instead to test the waters with a time-bound pilot test 
among a limited sample of  branches.
3 A summary of  this research can be found in “Youth Savings in Developing Countries: Trends in Practice, Gaps in Knowledge” (2010) by the YouthSave Consortium. Avail-
able at: http://www.youthsave.org/content/youth-savings-developing-countries. 
4 These communities were chosen based on geographic overlap between bank partners’ catchment areas and places where Save the Children had a strong ability to reach low-
income youth. 
5 Deshpande, op.cit. 
Staff at Bank of Kathmandu’s Gongabu branch participate in a training on the new 
Chetansil Yuwa Bachat Yojana account. Photo credit: Jaya Burathoki/Save the Children.
Savings have been associated with better 
mental health, educational attainment, and 
less-risky sexual attitudes and behaviors.
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TABLE 1: PARTNERS AND PROPOSED PRODUCTS, PRE-PILOT TEST
Notes:  
1. “Total deposits” refers to all funds on deposit (i.e., does not capture youth market specifically).  
2.  Asset and employee figures for BCS and HFC current as of end 2011; figure for Postbank as of end 2010; figure for BoK as of mid-2011.  
3. Branch figures are current as of end 2011.
COLOMBIA GHANA KENYA NEPAL
BANK Banco Caja Social HFC Bank Postbank Bank of Kathmandu
TYPE OF BANK Private commercial bank Private commercial bank Government savings bank Private commercial bank
TOTAL DEPOSITS $3.9B $165M $173M $245M
NUMBER OF 
BRANCHES
264 26 99 43
NUMBER OF 
EMPLOYEES
5,680 584 786 484
YOUTH 
PRODUCT




• Programmed savings over 
12 – 60 months
• Opening balance:      
COP 20,000
• Minimum monthly 
deposit: COP 20,000 
(no penalty for missing        
a deposit)
• Withdrawals: limited to   
1 per year at cost of 
COP 5,000, after balance 
reaches COP 65,000
• Account closure:       
COP 5,000
• Various account opening 
incentives offered on a 
promotional basis (e.g. 
rubber bracelets)
• Savings account
• Opening balance: GHS 2
• Operating balance:    
GHS 5
• No withdrawals for first 
three months; monthly 
thereafter
• Interest on balances over 
GHS 20
• No transaction fees
• ATM card: GHS 4
• Free piggy bank
• Savings account
• Opening balance: KES 50
• Operating balance:     
KES 200
• Withdrawal fee: KES 30
• Free money bag, debit 
card, savings diary
• KES 300 to replace lost 
debit card, KES 100 for 
other items 
• Bundled savings and fixed 
account product, with 
50% of each deposit 
credited to each account
• Opening balance:       
NPR 100
• Preferential interest rates
• Unrestricted withdrawals 
from savings account but 
withdrawal from fixed 
deposit only at term end




• Branches for all        
transactions
• Agents: deposits only
• Branches for all        
transactions
• ATMs: check balances 
only
• Branches for all        
transactions
• ATMs: check balances 
only
• Branches for all        
transactions
• On-site banking at select 
schools
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THE DECISION: TO PILOT OR NOT TO PILOT
The general advantages of  pilot testing are intuitively obvi-
ous. It is much easier and less expensive (and less potentially 
injurious to the reputation) to fix errors in design or execu-
tion in a controlled environment. Piloting also allows an FI to 
evaluate product performance without the extensive financial 
investment required for a full product launch. As one group 
of  microfinance experts puts it, “At each subsequent stage of  
(savings) product development, it costs a factor of  several times 
more to correct any error.”6  
Because the products developed under YouthSave differed in 
key ways from other youth products the partner banks had in 
their portfolio, the case for pilot testing was especially strong. 
Although all of  the partner banks already offered some form of  
youth-oriented savings account, in three of  the four, these were 
trustee accounts targeted at parents saving for their children.7  
YouthSave accounts, on the other hand, are intended to actively 
engage youth themselves in the process of  saving.8 The accounts 
therefore required not only a different product design, but differ-
ent marketing and delivery channels than the banks had used in 
the past. Piloting would provide an opportunity to see whether, 
in reality, all these elements met youths’ needs and whether young 
customers could effectively access and use the accounts — infor-
mation that market research alone cannot confirm. 
That said, the decision to pursue pilot testing was still far from 
automatic. Among the arguments against it:
Loss of  competitive advantage. There is no way to conduct 
a pilot test in perfect secrecy. The longer the pilot tests last, the 
greater the risk the banks’ competition will find out about the 
new product and rush an imitation product to market. A pilot 
test can take months whereas, as the Nepalese partner put it, “it 
only takes two days to copy any product.”
Opportunity costs and hard costs. Of  all YouthSave partner 
banks, only one had prior experience with a systematic, large-
scale external product pilot — and then too, for only one product 
(Postbank’s Bidii Savings account). Undertaking a major new 
process within an established organization always carries costs in 
terms of  reallocating staff  time from other tasks, and the need 
for extra management attention. In addition, there are the hard 
costs of  technical assistance that is often needed to support an 
unfamiliar process (in this case, the costs of  TA were supported 
by YouthSave in partnership with The MasterCard Foundation). 
Marketing can also be more laborious and costly (on a per-unit 
basis) during a small pilot than a large-scale rollout.  Because 
mass media advertising is not deployed during the pilot stage, 
branch staff  must put extra time and effort into selling the 
product directly to the targeted population.  Similarly, marketing 
collateral and give-aways that must be produced in small quanti-
ties for the pilot can cost more per item than if  manufactured 
in larger lots.  However, the total expenditure is a great deal less 
than it would be for a full rollout, and testing these materials 
minimizes the chances of  wasting a bigger investment later on.  
Pilots can therefore be seen as a way of  containing expenses, 
since they build in the chance to refine or even discontinue 
products (as well as associated marketing and delivery channels) 
that do not meet expectations. 
6 McCord, Michael J., Graham A.N. Wright and David Cracknell (2003). “A Toolkit for Planning, Conducting, and Monitoring Pilot Tests — Savings Products”. Nairobi: 
MicroSave. 
7 YouthSave’s Colombian bank partner, BCS, already had a deposit account aimed at youth themselves. 
8 While in Colombia, youth may independently own and operate an account from approximately age 12 (depending on legal status and other factors), in the other three coun-
tries, this ability only begins with legal majority (age 16 in Nepal and 18 in Ghana and Kenya). In these three countries, the banks have fostered a sense of  youth ownership by 
requiring youth involvement in all facets of  account operation. While any account would allow youth to make deposits independently, YouthSave accounts are unique in their 
markets in that youth must also participate in opening the account and in making withdrawals (alongside their “trusted adult” — the legal owner, co-owner, or trustee of  the 
account). Unlike other child/youth savings accounts, the adults cannot withdraw funds from YouthSave accounts in the absence of  the youth account holder. 
Piloting would provide an opportunity 
to see whether, in reality, all these elements 
met youths’ needs and whether young 
customers could effectively access and use 
the accounts — information that market 
research alone cannot confirm.
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After carefully weighing these costs and benefits, the four part-
ners made their decisions. Colombia’s Banco Caja Social decided 
to proceed directly to rollout, based on its confidence in the mar-
ket research, the strength of  the product development process, 
and its desire to adhere to established and rigorous bank process-
es, which included an internal pilot simulating product transac-
tions on the bank’s systems. The other three partners decided to 
run external pilot tests, which kicked off  with workshops that 
brought together the heads of  key departments within the banks, 
as well as project research and implementation partners. 
These workshops proved critical in establishing a sound 
foundation for the pilots. They brought together cross-functional 
teams from each institution, ensuring bank-wide understand-
ing of  and commitment to the pilot exercise. In addition, the 
workshops provided a forum for making decisions efficiently and 
advancing progress on several key aspects:
Pilot test team. While normally the banks’ business develop-
ment/marketing divisions led product development, these pilot 
test teams also involved several other key departments including 
operations, IT, legal, risk, and finance. This cross-functionality 
was critical to ensure that the final products were vetted by 
all relevant departments and met both internal and regulatory 
requirements. In addition, the involvement of  a “champion” — 
a senior executive with institutional authority — proved integral 
to the successful functioning of  the pilot test teams.9
Selection of  test branches. Financial product development 
experts recommend that the number of  branches in a pilot 
exercise be large and diverse enough to be representative, but 
small enough to be manageable and to minimize costs. Test 
branches should also be easy to monitor from the head office. 
For YouthSave, additional branch selection criteria included 
locations where branches could reach a sufficient population of  
low-income youth. 
Length of  pilot. All three partner banks wanted a pilot 
phase long enough to yield useful data — but not a day longer, 
so as to minimize delay-to-market. The initial proposal was for 
a six-month trial, a duration some practitioners cite as ideal for 
new products such as youth savings.10 Others advocated for half  
that time, believing that three months minimized the threat of  
competition. In the end, the Ghanaian and Kenyan teams struck 
a compromise that allowed for an initial three-month pilot with 
the possibility of  an extension pending mid-point review. In 
Nepal, the pilot also ended up proceeding in two phases. How-
ever, this was driven not by the preferences of  the bank but by 
regulatory concerns, raised shortly before the pilot was to begin, 
about the proposed school-based delivery mechanism. Initial pi-
loting in Nepal therefore took place through branches, followed 
by schools once regulatory approval was obtained. 
Pilot targets. This objective was necessarily the most difficult 
to determine since, as noted, this type of  youth savings account 
represented a significant departure from business as usual. 
For this reason, Bank of  Kathmandu declined to set targets, 




NUMBER (% OF TOTAL) 
OF TEST BRANCHES
REGIONS
HFC BANK, GHANA 26 4 (15%) Greater Accra, Central, Ashanti  
and North regions
POSTBANK, KENYA 99 12 (12%) Western, Coast, Nairobi, Central,  
and Eastern regions
BANK OF KATHMANDU, NEPAL 43 4 (9%) Kathmandu Valley and Western Provinces
9 Those champions were: for Ghana, the executive director for business development; for Nepal, the head of  marketing and corporate communications; and for Kenya, the 
head of  marketing and business development. 
10 McCord et al, op.cit.  
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choosing instead to conduct the pilot as a purely exploratory 
exercise. The two African partners ultimately based targets on 
rates of  uptake for past products, obtaining sufficient numbers 
to be able to observe product trends, and local market condi-
tions. Table 3 presents the duration, targets, and actual uptake 
achieved during the pilots. 
Key Questions. All three partner banks had specific prod-
uct design and delivery issues that they anticipated the pilot test 
process could help them understand. Withdrawal limits, interest 
rates, service fees, promotional items, documentation require-
ments, and many more technical considerations were all on the 
table and, to varying degrees, the pilot test yielded valuable infor-
mation about all of  them. But the overarching areas of  inquiry of  
paramount importance to all three banks were:
• Product uptake. The core objective of  the pilot test was 
to gauge market response to the products. The rate at 
which the accounts were being taken up was a critical in-
dicator of  the product’s appeal, as well as young people’s 
ability to effectively access the account. 
• Account usage. Directly related to the sustainability and 
profitability issue is the question of  account usage. 
Banks wanted to understand the potential of  the youth 
accounts to mobilize significant deposit volumes in 
comparison to their other savings products, and also 
what young people’s transaction patterns looked like. 
Would usage patterns be characterized by low account 
balances and frequent withdrawals? Or alternatively, 
might the average user, possibly in response to incen-
tives (positive or negative) keep transactions to a mini-
mum and grow their balances?
• Customer satisfaction. For most banks testing this line of  
business, youth savings is a long term strategy, and one 
that depends crucially on developing lifelong, loyal cus-
tomers. To win that early loyalty, the bank must ensure 
that the youth customers are in fact satisfied. As the 
saying goes, you do not get a second chance to make a 
good first impression. 
TESTING AND RESULTS
Each bank undertook its pilot testing process with ongo-
ing technical assistance from the Consortium, led by Save the 
Children. In each market, the process was driven, as noted, by a 
pilot test team, championed by an empowered senior executive, 
and staffed by employees from a representative cross-section of  
departments. The composition and commitment level of  these 
teams proved decisive, as the cross-functional approach helped 
promote bank-wide buy-in, enhancing an identity for youth sav-
ings as a bank-wide initiative rather than an external project. 
The pilot test teams in each market closely monitored every 
aspect of  the youth savings pilot in order to draw conclusions 
around the three core areas of  inquiry. Below are highlights of  
their findings and experiences.
Product Uptake. The two banks that set targets reached 70-
75% of  their pilot goals in terms of  number of  accounts opened. 
TABLE 3: PILOT TEST TARGETS AND DURATION
LENGTH OF  
PILOT TEST
ACCOUNT TARGETS  
PER BRANCH
TOTAL ACCOUNT 
TARGETS FOR PILOT 
ENDPOINT
ACTUAL ACCOUNTS 
OPENED AS OF  
PILOT ENDPOINT
GHANA July – December 2011
(5.5 Months)
100 400 306
KENYA July – December 2011
(5 Months)
80 960 673
NEPAL September – December 2011
(4 Months)
N/A N/A 338
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However, perhaps the most important uptake-related learnings 
were not about the numbers, but about the drivers behind them. 
The pilots highlighted the importance of  three drivers in particu-
lar: accessibility, institutional alignment, and marketing. 
Accessibility. In trying to mobilize new youth savings accounts, 
YouthSave’s partner banks soon realized how many prospec-
tive youth customers lived or went to school in areas far from 
pilot branches, which significantly slowed anticipated account 
uptake. The banks therefore found it necessary to diversify their 
delivery channels, in ways both similar to and different from 
the tactics many FIs have used to reach low-income adults. In 
Kenya, for example, Postbank enabled mobile/agent banking to 
capture deposits (although withdrawals must still be made from 
a branch, in order to ensure the presence of  both the youth and 
his/her trusted adult).
Other delivery mechanisms were tailored for youth. The banks 
created ways to reach youth where they gathered, namely schools 
and, for out-of-school youth, market centers. In Nepal, Bank of  
Kathmandu participated in financial education sessions conduct-
ed by Save the Children’s local partner NGOs. Bank staff  also 
returned to select schools on a biweekly basis so that students 
could conduct transactions on-site. In Ghana and Kenya, the 
banks deployed marketing/sales staff  into schools where they 
were allowed to make product presentations and open accounts. 
Based on results, HFC Bank in Ghana has begun instituting 
school-based banking to facilitate access. 
That virtually 100% of  the pilot accounts were opened by 
school-going youth simultaneously demonstrates the success of  
these strategies and the relative difficulties the banks encountered 
in reaching out-of-school youth. In Ghana, for example, HFC 
Bank arranged meetings to introduce Enidaso to trade “masters” 
who typically have many young apprentices. However, these 
meetings surfaced several obstacles: 1) youths’ mistrust of  banks; 
2) masters’ mistrust of  youth (many thought that their appren-
tices would start stealing in order to save); 3) youths’ mistrust of  
adults (many did not want to open an account with a trustee or 
co-owner); and 4) these youths’ lack of  necessary ID documents. 
HFC agents also tried to approach youth working in market 
centers and lorry parks. But the bank staff  discovered that many 
such youth were migrants suspicious that these uniformed adults 
were part of  a government repatriation scheme. (HFC staff  sub-
sequently started travelling with business cards they could hand 
out as proof  of  their identity.)
While the specifics of  HFC’s example are perhaps unique, the 
larger issues of  out-of-school youth lacking proof  of  identifica-
tion or a trusted adult (or both) were all too common across the 
pilot sites. In response to documentation problems, the piloting 
banks modified their Know-Your-Customer (KYC) require-
ments to accept baptismal cards, birth announcements, or letters 
from local authorities instead of  the typically required birth 
certificates or other government-issued identification. But many 
out-of-school youth did not possess (or could not obtain) even 
these. Also, especially in countries where at least some education 
is mandated by law, youth were frequently reluctant to identify 
themselves as “out-of-school.” Finally, such youth were generally 
more dispersed than their school-going counterparts and so took 
Promotional poster for HFC Bank Ghana’s Enidaso account.
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Marketing. As described above, marketing efforts during the pi-
lots were closely linked to efforts to enable effective youth access 
to the accounts. 
Youth respondents from the initial 2010 market research had 
expressed a clear preference for radio and television as their 
media of  choice. But they had also said that they liked receiving 
information in more direct and personalized ways, e.g. through 
school assemblies, community meetings, or other interactive fora. 
Because mass media outlets could not be confined to the select 
environments to which the pilot testing was deliberately limited 
— remember the banks’ concerns about secrecy and potential 
loss of  their competitive edge — the partners chose to de-em-
phasize media advertising and focus instead on direct marketing.
Such marketing took place through “activation” events (com-
munity events with games and entertainment), school presenta-
tions, street theater, and in conjunction with financial education 
conducted by Save the Children. These activities often included 
opportunities to open accounts on the spot, and sometimes to 
conduct transactions. However, the success of  these activities in 
terms of  achieving uptake was often determined by the presence 
of  the trusted adult needed to co-sign on the account. In Kenya, 
for example, the most successful single event in terms of  account 
opening was a community fair, at which one branch opened more 
accounts than at any of  the activation events organized specifi-
more time to locate, making them a less attractive sales proposi-
tion for time-constrained branch staff.11
The difficulties all partner banks have encountered in reach-
ing out-of-school youth underline the fact that access is about 
more than location. Especially for marginalized populations, it is 
about overcoming legal and social deficits that may render even a 
nearby bank branch and its products out-of-reach. 



























































11 On the other hand, there is some reason to believe that working youth may generate higher deposit balances than school-going youth, though the pilot did not generate 
sufficient numbers of  out-of-school accounts to draw conclusions on this. 
Entertainers at a community activation event in Kitui, for Kenya Postbank’s SMATA 
account. Photo credit: Corrinne Ngurukie/Save the Children.
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cally for SMATA. This was because families tended to attend 
the fair together, meaning that the parents were already present, 
whereas other activation events were not explicitly designed to 
attract adults in addition to youth.
Institutional Alignment. Bank-wide buy-in — particularly the 
personal commitment of  branch managers and their teams — 
proved a fi nal critical driver of  uptake. Across the pilots, the 
performance of  individual branches in a given country varied 
dramatically. In Nepal, a single branch contributed half  of  all the 
pilot accounts opened. In Kenya, one branch brought in over 110 
accounts, while others opened fewer than 20 (see Chart 1). While 
this variation was to some extent due to local market conditions, 
the pilot test teams also attributed it to the drive and enthusiasm 
of  branch staff, which in turn was largely a product of  the com-
mitment of  the branch manager.
Branch buy-in at the beginning of  a pilot cannot be assumed. 
Indeed, before these pilots, not all partner bank staff  fully under-
stood or supported the objectives of  YouthSave. But experience 
has shown that typical methods of  training bank staff  on new 
products — commonly through an email or a posting on the 
intranet — are often inadequate to ensure that staff  understand 
and cascade this information as necessary. Instead, Consortium 
partners and piloting banks organized face-to-face trainings for 
key branch staff  in all three countries. These trainings took staff  
through the rationale for the products and the new processes and 
procedures they entailed, including those associated with Youth-
Save’s research activities.12
The training sessions also provided an opportunity to address 
ethical and reputational worries raised by some staff: the per-
ceived potential of  savings to distract young people from their 
education and tempt them to focus instead on money-generat-
ing pursuits, the question of  where youth obtained their money, 
as well as issues of  child labor. These concerns were allayed by 
sharing key fi ndings from the market research, which showed 
that the majority of  youth were in fact saving already, and that 
most of  their income originated from their own families. The 
trainings also encouraged staff  to embrace their particular 
12 These activities include the collection of  additional demographic data at account opening. 
13 In line with its internal child safeguarding policies, Save the Children has created a youth risk monitoring strategy based on the elements of  awareness, prevention, report-
ing, and responding, and assisted our partner banks to integrate it into their product delivery. For more information, please see http://www.youthsave.org/content/keeping-
youth-fi nancial-services-becoming-risky-business-highlights-youthsaves-risk-monitori.
Promotional poster for Kenya Postbank’s SMATA account.
role in protecting the young customers they would be serving, 
for example by orienting them to the youth risk monitoring 
system13 established with assistance from the Consortium’s tech-
nical team. Finally, the trainings guided staff  on how to interact 
with the local communities in ways that were new to them (e.g. 
conducting banking in schools). 
Ongoing involvement by the cross-functional pilot test team 
was another mechanism critical to producing institutional align-
ment around the new youth products. Many pilot test team 
members had been involved right from the product design 
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stage, so themselves felt a sense of  ownership and commitment 
to the product, which they then communicated to others.  Not 
only did team members participate in abovementioned trainings, 
they also cascaded information to both headquarters and branch 
staff, and provided continuous reinforcement and support to 
personnel in the field. 
For example, following initially slow product uptake, Kenya 
Postbank convened a follow-up training and fact-finding meet-
ing with its branch managers. They were encouraged to discuss 
candidly the successes, challenges, and potential solutions they 
were experiencing with the new product at their branches. Within 
two weeks of  this meeting, Postbank’s uptake increased by 42 per-
cent. In Ghana, the senior-level product champion at HFC Bank 
convened periodic conference calls with pilot test branch manag-
ers, which palpably increased the level of  branch-level support 
the product received. In all three countries, bank management ap-
pointed head office marketing staff  to support branch sales staff  
in their efforts, which not only bolstered uptake but built relation-
ships between headquarters and the field.14
Finally, in Nepal, BoK linked CYBY to the performance man-
agement system for branch staff  as a way of  ensuring that the 
training its staff  received on CYBY yielded results, and to assure 
proper monitoring.  But the bank also made product perfor-
mance the responsibility of  its marketing department, who were 
expected to support product mobilization and monitoring within 
the test period, and were evaluated against pilot results. 
Account Usage. The heart of  the business case for youth 
savings revolves around long-term customer retention — i.e. 
the ability to migrate youth to more lucrative adult products 
over time — and cross-sell. But the level of  investment re-
quired in maintaining youth accounts over time will be power-
fully influenced by whether transaction costs can be minimized 
and net deposits maximized. One staffer in Kenya expressed 
general anxiety around the sustainability question: “the cost of  
offering the account is higher than the income realized . . . the 
opening balance for example is only KES 50. In addition we 
are giving away free items which we are not sure we can sustain 
after funding dries up.”15
TABLE 4: SAVINGS OUTCOMES: PILOT PERIOD
VARIABLE GHANA KENYA NEPAL
PILOT PERIOD 5.5 months 5 months 4 months
TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS* 306 673 338
NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS IN RESEARCH** 278 384 310
TOTAL NUMBER OF DEPOSIT TRANSACTIONS 655 611 437
TOTAL NUMBER OF WITHDRAWAL TRANSACTIONS 10 30 2
TOTAL VALUE OF DEPOSITS*** 12,984 (16,435) 405,206 (9,869) 71,701 (1,998)
TOTAL VALUE OF WITHDRAWALS*** 3,893 (4,927) 99,420 (2,421) 3500 (98)
MONTHLY NET SAVINGS PER ACCOUNT $11 $11 $3
Source: Johnson, L., Lee, Y., Osei-Akoto, I., Njenga, M., & Sharma, S. (2012). “Product pilot report: Youth savings performance in Ghana, Kenya, and Nepal”  
(YouthSave Research Brief 12-38). St. Louis, MO: Washington University, Center for Social Development.  
* Total number of accounts opened during the pilot test. 
** Accounts with consent to participate in SDA research.  Account performance figures are given for these accounts only. Ghana sample does not include 
28 accounts without transactions. 
*** Figures in national currencies; PPP-converted US dollars in the parentheses. For all amounts, the purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates for 
2011 are drawn from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) dataset (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/index.htm).
14 Staff  incentives were not used during the pilots. 
15 In YouthSave, some banks used project support to fund initial marketing campaigns, including promotional items provided upon account opening.
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Although it does not settle the sustainability question in itself, 
evidence from the pilot indicates that young people do indeed 
have the capacity and willingness to save in these accounts, and 
suggests that balances will grow over time. As shown in Table 4, 
not only were monthly net savings positive, but the number of  
deposits swamped the number of  withdrawals in all three coun-
tries — in Nepal, by a factor of  218!  Interestingly, this pattern 
appeared to be independent of  product features related to with-
drawals. In Ghana, HFC Bank’s product prohibited all withdraw-
als within three months of  account opening, and limited them to 
one per month thereafter. The fact that only 7 withdrawals were 
made — compared to 471 deposits — when that period expired 
might suggest that the restriction succeeded in incentivizing the 
desired behavior. But the partners in Nepal and Kenya experi-
enced similar patterns, even without such restrictions.  Postbank 
charges KES 30 for withdrawals to disincentivize them, but the 
savings account component of  BoK’s product had neither fees 
nor limits on withdrawals.
As encouraging as these findings are with respect to savings 
patterns, they come with several caveats. First, they are very 
preliminary, with many accounts having been operational for 
three months or less. In fact, by the end of  the pilots, the aver-
age number of  days that accounts had been open was only 98 in 
Ghana, 49 in Kenya, and 45 in Nepal.16 So long- or even medium-
term patterns in account usage, along with evolution of  balances, 
remain to be seen. 
Nonetheless, the pilots did provide the banks with enough 
information to confirm that these youth savings accounts would 
not reach profitability within the time span of  other products in 
their portfolio. Rather, they would be loss leaders, an investment 
in cultivating the next generation of  clients. 
Customer Satisfaction. Although pilots by design test 
short-term questions, customer satisfaction issues have uniquely 
longer-term implications where youth savings are concerned. 
The general hope with customer satisfaction is that it results in 
loyalty and retention, resulting in future use of  a range of  the 
bank’s products and services. So a key goal for customer satisfac-
tion in this segment is that, even if  the youth savings business 
proves to be the bank’s loss leader for years, it will pay off  over a 
sufficiently long time horizon as a tactic for the bank to “grow its 
own” next generation of  customers.  This is particularly impor-
tant given the potentially high operating costs and uncertainty 
associated with youth savings.
The early indications from pilots on this front were positive. 
In all three markets, youth savings customers reported that hav-
ing a bank account made them feel important and grown up. 
Especially for low-income youth, accustomed to thinking of  the 
16 Ibid.  Note that these accounts were not subsequently closed; the numbers refer to the number of  days over which activity was tracked during the pilots. 
Promotional poster for Bank of Kathmandu’s Chetansil Yuwa Bachat Yojana account.
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ported, “the manager even calls me to remind me to deposit my 
savings. I feel good about this and it motivates me to save.”
The youth respondents also said that they appreciated know-
ing that their accounts were truly theirs. They especially ap-
preciated the provisions that all three banks created for these 
accounts, stipulating that trusted adults cannot access funds 
without the consent of  the youth account holder. As a Ghanaian 
girl put it, “I know that my account is mine and that no one can 
take money out of  it without me.”
However, older youth (those above 15 years of  age) also 
expressed the desire for even more control over their account, 
e.g. sole ownership, without a trusted adult. (This was less of  an 
issue in Nepal where, as noted, regulations permit anyone over 
the age of  16 to open a bank account in his or her own name.) 
Furthermore, some of  the youth clients specifi cally did not want 
to hold an account jointly with their parents. In response, the 
bank partners designed their accounts so that the trusted adult 
could be any legal major of  the youth’s choice. Teachers and old-
er siblings were often the preferred alternative, and, in Ghana, 
quite a few accounts were opened under one or two teachers per 
school, as was evident from discussions with teachers and review 
of  account opening forms during the pilot review process. 
Chart 2 shows the drivers behind youth client satisfaction in 
Ghana. Note that, among the fi ndings most important in terms 
of  the project’s goals, the young people reported that having 
their own savings account was indeed instilling in them a sense 
of  savings discipline. This reported sentiment is supported by 
the fi ndings of  actual behaviors as noted earlier in Table 4. 
At the same time, partner banks uncovered customer attitudes 
and preferences that led to product design modifi cations. For 
example, queries on account-opening incentives revealed that 
the money bag originally provided in Kenya was not attractive to 
youth, so during rollout it was replaced with a more substantial-
looking wallet. Similarly, focus groups with older youth in Nepal 
revealed that they valued an ATM card more than a piggy bank, 
and — since they were over 16 — were legally entitled to use it. 
Bank of  Kathmandu now gives majors a choice of  either an ATM 
card or a piggy bank. 
But perhaps the most important change suggested by the pilot 
in Nepal was to radically simplify the pilot account design, from 
a bundled savings/fi xed deposit to a simple savings account. 
CHART 2: DRIVERS OF CLIENT 
SATISFACTION IN GHANA
Source: Survey of 80 Enidaso youth account holders in Ghana, 
November 2011.
Question: “What Do You Like About the Account?”
Youth happy to be clients of the bank
Opportunity to inculcate savings habit
Move from informal to formal savings, in a safe place
Youth anticipating lockable money boxes
Outreach was intense, communications appealing






bank as the preserve not only of  adults but of  the wealthy, the 
chance to become a bank customer was considered a privilege 
and a sign of  social prestige.
Staff  attitudes appeared to contribute to youths’ comfort 
levels with the banks. Through simple customer service survey 
tools and focus groups, the youth in all three markets indicated 
that bank staff  were friendly, helpful, and approachable. In 
Ghana, for example, youth appreciated that bank staff  visited 
them in their schools. As one 17-year-old Ghanaian youth re-
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of  Kathmandu used a similar market research and piloting proto-
col for a new agricultural finance product, testing and refining it 
in select branches before full-scale rollout. These two banks also 
reported a public relations benefit from testing the youth savings 
account, with branch staff  observing that their standing in their 
respective communities has been enhanced and that people are 
more supportive of  their products and services.
During market research, youth had indicated that they wanted 
help accumulating larger sums over longer terms, and were even 
willing to have a portion of  their savings blocked to accomplish 
this. Having both a fixed account component, for longer-term 
accumulation, and a regular savings account component, for 
liquidity, was meant to respond to this. But interviews and 
focus groups with youth account holders during the pilot did 
not reflect a real understanding or appreciation of  the bundled 
account design — even though youth expressed the same desire 
for longer-term savings as they had in market research. This, 
combined with the operational risks and burdens associated with 
needing to split each deposit between two accounts, prompted 
the pilot test team to eliminate the fixed deposit feature. 
Table 5 illustrates the modifications made to each of  the prod-
ucts as a result of  the pilot findings, which center around making 
products simpler and more accessible for youth.
In addition to the lessons described above, partner banks 
reported deriving benefits from the experience of  the pilot test 
itself  — benefits that stretched beyond just the youth savings ac-
counts. Postbank, for example, has lowered the minimum balance 
on its original youth product to make it competitive with SMATA, 
and is targeting it to parents of  youth under 12. In Nepal, Bank 
“The pilot test gave us an opportunity to 
understand the product delivery process. If  
we had launched in 45 of  our branches 
without piloting and then realized that 
something was wrong, it would have been 
very difficult to undo the process.”
 — Bank of  Kathmandu management staff   
TABLE 5: PRODUCT REFINEMENTS POST PILOT EVALUATION
YOUTH SAVINGS PRODUCT (BANK, COUNTRY) REFINEMENTS MADE FOLLOWING RESULTS FROM PILOT EVALUATIONS
ENIDASO (HFC BANK, GHANA) • Increased flexibility in KYC documentation
• Reduced ATM card charges 
SMATA (KENYA POSTBANK) • Introduced an alternate/supplementary adult to accompany the youth for         
withdrawals
• Introduced group accounts to cater for organizations that want to open accounts 
for their youth groups
• Opened up other delivery channels (agents, mobile banking) for account holders 
to make deposits
• Replaced money bag with a wallet
CYBY (BANK OF KATHMANDU, NEPAL) • Eliminated bundled structure (savings and fixed deposit account) and replaced it 
with a simple savings account
• Introduced option for youth aged 16 and above to receive a debit card instead of 
a piggy bank
• Expanded age range to serve young people between 10 and 22 years to (1) 
strengthen business case and (2) respond to requests to open accounts for young 
children and their parents
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CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
Piloting was not without its challenges. Competing responsi-
bilities often cut into the available time that staff, especially in 
tightly-staffed branches, had to devote to pilot activities. Other 
major bank initiatives and school holidays often threw a wrench 
into intended schedules. And because pilots were not synchro-
nized with bank incentive calendars, branches that had planned 
staff  deployment in order to hit a certain set of  targets, had 
to reorganize. Last but not least, there were also the direct and 
indirect costs of  piloting discussed above.
However, almost all of  these downsides would have been 
felt during product rollout as well — and in a far more costly 
way. The main inconvenience of  piloting, then, for banks not 
well versed in the practice may be just that — management of  
an unfamiliar process. Of  course, in competitive markets, the 
other main disadvantage of  piloting is the chance it gives rivals 
to duplicate the product (and indeed, in Nepal, a competitor 
launched a similar product while CYBY was being piloted). 
Presumably, however, the competition would at that point be 
copying an untested product, without any of  the refinements that 
piloting enables.  In the case of  youth savings accounts — which, 
as discussed above, involve new clients who must be reached in 
innovative ways — these refinements are particularly critical to 
ultimate success.
During the approximately nine months since the products 
were launched in these three countries, several trends signaled by 
the pilots have been borne out. First, branch performance has 
continued to vary dramatically, and branch staff  commitment 
to the product remains a key factor. Besides providing trainings 
(based on those during the pilot) to staff  across the network, the 
partner banks have either instituted or are experimenting with 
staff  incentives to ensure that the youth savings products receive 
due attention. 
Second, reaching out-of-school youth continues to be a chal-
lenge. It was hoped that the mass media introduced at rollout 
would help attract some of  these more dispersed youth, who had 
been difficult to reach with the below-the-line, direct marketing 
used during the pilots. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. 
Highly marginalized populations such as out-of-school youth may 
well require dedicated institutional arrangements (i.e. social inter-
mediation) that — though potentially high-touch and low-scale — 
can help them surmount the particular obstacles in their path. 
On a more positive note, the transaction patterns noted during 
the pilots have remained largely consistent. Deposits continue to 
dwarf  withdrawals in terms of  both number and value. In fact, in 
Ghana and Kenya, fewer than 5% of  account holders made with-
drawals at all. In Nepal, this number was approximately 25% — 
higher than in the pilot, but still a minority of  all youth clients.17 In 
retrospect, concerns that eliminating the term deposit portion of  
the original account design would produce a significant outflow of  
funds, appear to have been unfounded. In fact, average balances 
have so exceeded BoK’s expectations that the bank is no longer 
concerned about the initial cost of  the free piggy banks. 
The pilots thus seem to have fulfilled their role as “early warning 
systems” for the rollouts. They provided an accurate preview of  
the trends and challenges on which the banks would have to focus 
17 These and other findings related to rollout performance will be summarized in the Saving Demand Assessment annual report, forthcoming from the Center for Social 
Development. For more information, please see www.youthsave.org or http://csd.wustl.edu/AssetBuilding/YouthSave/Pages/YouthSave.aspx. 
TABLE 6: RESULTS SINCE ROLLOUT






The pilots provided an accurate preview 
of  the trends and challenges on which the 
banks would have to focus during rollouts.
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YouthSave Pilots: Key Success Factors and Lessons Learned
Product level
1.  Youth are both able and willing to save in formal FIs and, in fact, the opportunity to do so appears to be a main driver of the appeal 
of youth savings accounts. 
2. Access is a function of legal and social capabilities, not just physical proximity.  Youth without trusted adults or documentation will 
require more intensive outreach and facilitation in order to access and use savings accounts.
3. Marketing activities targeted at account realization should focus on opportunities to reach youth and trusted adults at the same time.
4. Branch staff support and commitment to youth savings products are critical to their success. Marketing and delivery plans must take       
account of human resources available at branch level.
Process level
5. Institutional alignment is key to a successful pilot, and starts with an empowered, committed product champion at senior manage-
ment level.
6. An enthusiastic, cross-functional team to oversee and coordinate pilot testing activities ensures that all relevant departments within 
an FI have a voice and a stake in the pilot.
7. The importance of branch staff buy-in cannot be overstated; youth savings products live or die by the efforts of staff who actually 
interact with youth. 
8. Sufficient time must be allotted to run a meaningful pilot.  A mid-pilot review can be very helpful to identify challenges to account 
uptake and usage as well as client satisfaction, before testing ways to resolve them during the rest of the pilot.
9. Although piloting is unfamiliar to many FIs, openness to experimenting with new processes — mirroring the creativity and dyna-
mism of youth — can produce lessons that would not be gleaned from business-as-usual.
to drive uptake and, to an extent, desired usage.  But perhaps most 
importantly, the pilots enabled YouthSave partner banks to deepen 
their understanding of  young clients. By “checking in” once again 
with target youth, the banks verified whether the findings from 
market research had been correctly translated into product features 
youth truly needed and used. That verification process in turn al-
lowed the banks to simplify their products’ features and make them 
more accessible to their target customers. Finally, the pilots helped 
reveal which subsegments of  the youth market could successfully 
be reached with a strategy designed for scale — and which will 
likely require more intensive, targeted outreach. 
In this way, the pilots helped identify critical success factors 
(summarized below) that guided the eventual product rollouts.  
While more is clearly being learned as rollout unfolds — espe-
cially about how to sustain interest in and usage of  the accounts 
— the lessons learned during piloting gave the three YouthSave 
partner banks a head start on this process, putting them on the 
best possible footing for nationwide product launch. It is the 
Consortium’s hope that the financial inclusion field will keep the 
findings from these three pilots in mind as the search continues 
for sustainable ways to make safe, accessible savings services 
available to low-income youth.
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